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Abstract 
Face morphing represents nowadays a big security threat in the context of electronic identity documents as well 
as an interesting challenge for researchers in the field of face recognition. Despite of the good performance 
obtained by state-of-the-art approaches on digital images, no satisfactory solutions have been identified so far to 
deal with cross-database testing and printed-scanned images (typically used in many countries for document 
issuing). In this work, novel approaches are proposed to train Deep Neural Networks for morphing detection: in 
particular generation of simulated printed-scanned images together with other data augmentation strategies and 
pre-training on large face recognition datasets, allowed to reach state-of-the-art accuracy on challenging datasets 
from heterogeneous image sources. 
 
1. Introduction 
The widespread adoption of biometric identification techniques in the context of identity documents 
poses some concerns for the possibility of fraudulent misuses. Recent studies [1] [2] [3] [4] revealed that 
ePassports are particularly sensitive to the so called morphing attack, where the  face photo printed on 
paper and provided by the citizen can be altered. Such attack was first described in [2] in the context of 
face verification at Automated Border Control (ABC) gates where two subjects cooperate to produce a 
morphed face image (mixing their identities) in order to obtain a regular travel document that could be 
exploited by both subjects (see Figure 1). Of course, in order to succeed in the attack, the morphed face 
image must be very similar to one of the two subjects (the one applying for the document) to fool the 
officer during the issuing process, but at the same time must contain enough features of the hidden 
subject to enable positive verification at the gate for both individuals.  
The feasibility of this attack has been analyzed and confirmed by several researchers and some police 
agencies, thus making the development of proper countermeasures quite urgent. 
One of the main challenges for the development of effective solutions for morphing detection is that 
typically the id photo, natively digital, is printed by the photographer and then scanned by the officer to 
be stored into the document chip. This Printing/Scanning process (P&S) alters the image information, 
removing most of the fine details (i.e. digital processing artifacts) that could help to detect morphing. 
Some preliminary studies, more widely discussed in the next section, show that morphing detection from 
digital images can be addressed to some extent, but P&S images are still difficult to manage [5]. 
Promising solutions have been recently obtained by using Deep Neural Networks (DNN), which proved 
to effectively detect and recognize faces in uncontrolled scenarios [6]. However, to reach a good 
                                                 
 
1 The paper is currently under consideration at Pattern Recognition. 
accuracy, DNN typically require a large training dataset. Unfortunately, in the context of morphing 
detection, it is difficult to collect large databases of samples: manually producing high quality morphed 
images is in general a boring and time-consuming activity. Moreover, due to the need of detecting 
morphing from P&S images, the costs/efforts for printing the images and scanning them again must be 
also considered. For this reason, most of the approaches in the literature exploit pre-trained deep 
networks as feature extractors, and build on the top of them traditional classifiers (e.g., SVM) that can 
be trained with relatively small datasets. The aim of this study is to investigate the possibility of 
artificially generating large sets of morphed images to train DNNs. In particular, this work focuses on 
the simulation of the P&S process which, coupled with the automatic generation of morphs, can produce 
large datasets for i) training new networks from scratch or ii) fine-tuning pre-trained DNNs such as 
AlexNet [7] or VGG [8]. Moreover, an extensive analysis of the network behavior with respect to 
genuine/morphed and digital/printed-scanned images enables a deeper understanding of the most 
relevant image features exploited for classification. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the state of the art; in Section 3 the 
procedure for automatic printed/scanned image generation is described. The DNNs used for the 
experiments are briefly introduced in Section 5 and the experimental results are reported and commented 
in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions and discusses possible future research directions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Morphing attack: the face image provided to the officer is visually very similar to the applicant (i.e. the accomplice), 
but also contains facial features of the criminal. Both subjects can use the document to transit through an ABC gate. 
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2. Related works and contribution 
Although face morphing detection is a recently emerged research area, an increasing number of 
researchers are working on this topic and the related literature is constantly growing [9]. Existing 
techniques can be mainly framed in two categories: 
 single-image based, where the presence of morphing alterations is detected on a single image, such 
as the id photo presented to the officer at enrolment time or the face image read from an e-document 
during verification at the gate;  
 image-pair based (a.k.a. differential morphing detection), where the comparison between a live 
image (e.g., acquired at the gate) and that stored on the e-document is exploited for morphing 
detection. 
Most of the literature approaches belong to the first category. The works based on handcrafted features 
mainly try to analyze the small image degradations produced by the morphing process. In [10] the 
authors propose a technique for morphing detection based on the analysis of micro-texture variations 
using Binarized Statistical Image Features (BSIF): an SVM classifier is trained to discriminate 
genuine/morphed faces. The authors of [11] argue that the morphed images are characterized by a 
different texture with respect to the unaltered ones and that a progressive JPG compression can further 
highlight this aspect; the image content is finally represented by different corner features exploited for 
classification. In [12] [13] [14] morphing detection is based on Benford features extracted from 
quantized DCT coefficients, in [15] key-points features (such as SURF, ORB, FAST, etc.) are used, 
while in [16] and [17] LBP features are analyzed. An interesting outcome of [16] is that low-level 
features are not robust when used in cross-database testing or in the presence of simple image 
manipulations (e.g., rescaling). The authors of [18] and [19] exploit the principle of image source 
identification for morphing detection, observing that a morphing is a computer-generated image and its 
sensor-pattern noise is different from that of a real image. Other works make use of topological analysis 
of facial landmarks to detect alterations introduced by morphing [20] [21]; the idea is interesting in 
principle, but overall the results obtained are unsatisfactory for real application. Most of the referred 
approaches, when tested on digital images only, provide good classification performance, but the use of 
different databases and different evaluation metrics make a comparison quite difficult.      
Deep learning techniques based on Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) have been proposed for face 
morphing detection [17] [22] [23] [24]. The authors of [17] evaluate some networks, pre-trained for face 
recognition, as feature extractor for digital images, without performing any fine-tuning on the specific 
morphing detection task, while in [22] two pre-trained networks, AlexNet [7] and VGG19 [8], are used 
for feature extraction after a fine-tuning step. The authors perform tests on both digital and P&S images 
and the experimental results clearly confirm that the second type of images represent the main challenge 
for morphing detection. In [23] some CNNs are used for morphing detection from digital images; the 
accuracy of pre-trained networks is compared to that of networks learned from scratch, finally leading 
to the conclusion that pre-trained networks are more robust for this task. The authors of [24] analyze the 
accuracy of pre-trained networks against semantic (partial morphing on some specific face regions) and 
black box attacks (partial occlusions), and highlight, for the two kind of images, the most relevant 
regions analyzed by the networks for classification. Finally the authors of [25] combine features of 
different nature, hand-crafted and extracted by CNNs, demonstrating that a substantial improvement in 
detection performance can be achieved by their integration.   
To the best of our knowledge, only two approaches perform morphing detection by image-pair 
comparison. The first approach has been introduced in [26] [27] where the inverse process of morphing 
(called demorphing) is adopted to revert the effects produced by morphing. The demorphing technique 
proved to be effective both on digital and P&S images. The same detection scheme has been considered 
in [28] where different features are evaluated both for single-image and differential morphing detection.   
Overall, an analysis of the literature allows to identify two major challenges for morphing detection 
techniques: i) robustness to the P&S process; ii) ability to generalize across different databases [29]. The 
present work mainly focuses on these two aspects. In particular, this paper provides the following 
contributions: 
- Adoption of the P&S simulation model proposed in [30] for data augmentation (to the best of 
our knowledge this is the first attempt of P&S simulation in this context), enabling the possibility 
of producing training images without the cost/effort of the real P&S process. Such simulation 
produces a significant performance improvement on morphing detection from P&S images. 
- Extensive experiments using four different well-known DNN architectures on three real test 
datasets. In this work, we perform an extensive analysis of CNNs pre-trained on large scale face 
recognition datasets, proving their superiority when dealing with P&S images. 
- Comparison between direct classification after network fine-tuning and use of the network for 
feature extraction only, coupled with an external classifier. 
- Even if a direct comparison is not feasible, because of the lack of P&S public databases, the 
performance of the proposed solution on P&S images compares favorably with other state-of-
the-art approaches (Table 7). 
 
3. Automatic image generation 
In order to exploit the great potential of CNNs for classification, a very large set of images is typically 
needed and usually data augmentation techniques are applied [31] to increase the number of samples 
available for training; geometric and photometric transformations are the most frequently adopted 
modifications. In the context of morphing detection, the network training requires both real and morphed 
image samples, possibly in the two formats (digital and P&S). To avoid the effort/cost of collecting a 
large dataset we proposed novel techniques for automatically generating high quality morphed face 
images (Section 3.1) and simulating the P&S process (Section 3.2). 
3.1. Face morphing  
Morphed images can be obtained quite easily using one of the many existing tools and plugins (e.g., 
Sqirlz Morph [32]). However, the systematic generation of morphed images with specific characteristics 
can be better realized by ad hoc techniques. Here we adopt the approach described in [26] which includes 
an automatic image retouching phase to minimize visible artifacts. Given two images 𝐼0 and 𝐼1, the 
process generates a set of frames 𝕄 = {𝐼𝛼 , 𝛼 ∈ ℝ, 0 < 𝛼 < 1} representing the transformation of the 
first image (𝐼0) into the second one (𝐼1) (see Figure 2). In general, each frame is a weighted linear 
combination of 𝐼0 and 𝐼1, obtained by geometric warping of the two images based on corresponding 
landmarks and pixel-by-pixel blending. Formally: 
𝐼𝛼(𝐩) = (1 − 𝛼) ⋅ 𝐼0 (𝑤𝑃𝛼→𝑃0(𝐩)) + 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐼1 (𝑤𝑃𝛼→𝑃1(𝐩)), (1) 
where: 
 𝐩 is a generic pixel position; 
 𝛼 is the frame weight factor (representing the presence of the two contributing subjects); 
 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 are the two sets of landmarks in 𝐼0 and 𝐼1, respectively; 
 𝑃𝛼 is the set of landmarks aligned according to the frame weight factor 𝛼; 
 𝑤𝐵→𝐴(𝐩) is a warping function. 
A number of different morphed images can be obtained according to the value of the weighting factor 𝛼 
(i.e. the weight of the two subjects in the combination) as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of morphed frames obtained by the morphing procedure, gradually moving from 𝐼0 to 𝐼1 (first row). In the 
second row the result of the automatic retouching process used to remove visible artifacts is shown. 
 
 
3.2. Modeling the printing and scanning process 
The P&S process is quite complex: i) digital images are first conveyed to the physical, continuous 
domain and then ii) re-digitalized and discretized by the scanning process. The image alterations 
introduced involve both pixel value distortions (i.e. luminance, contrast and gamma corrections, 
chrominance variations and blurring of adjacent pixels) as well as minor geometric alterations due to the 
positioning on the scanner surface. 
Focusing on the pixel value distortion, according to the model proposed in [30] the P&S process of a 
generic digital image 𝐼 produces a modified, discrete version of the image 𝐼 as: 
 
𝐼(𝐩) = 𝐾[𝐼(𝐩) ∗ 𝜏1(𝐩) + (𝑥(𝐩) ∗ 𝜏2(𝐩)) ∙ 𝑁1] ∙ 𝑠(𝐩), (2) 
 
 
𝐼0 𝐼1 
𝐼0.2 𝐼0.4 𝐼0.6 𝐼0.8 
where: 
 Function 𝐾 represents the responsivity of the acquisition device; 
 𝑠(𝐩) is the sampling function which characterizes the digitalization process of the continuous printed 
image; 
 𝜏1 models the system point spread function 𝜏1(𝐩) = 𝜏𝑃(𝐩) ∗ 𝜏𝑆(𝐩) where 𝜏𝑃(𝐩) and 𝜏𝑆(𝐩) represent 
the point spread function of printer and scanner, respectively; 
 𝜏2 is a high-pass filter used to represent higher noise variance near the edges; 
 𝑁1 is a white Gaussian random noise. 
The following responsivity function 𝐾 is adopted: 
 
𝐾(𝑥) = 𝜔 ∙ (𝑥 − 𝛽𝑥)
𝛾 + 𝛽𝐾 + 𝑁2(𝑥) (3) 
 
It includes color adjustments coefficients (𝛽𝑥 and 𝛽𝐾), gamma correction (𝛾) and a noise component 
𝑁2(𝑥) whose power is related to pixel intensity (usually higher noise on dark pixels is observed due to 
the different sensors’ sensitivity to the image reflectivity).  
Due to some device-dependent unknown parameters, the adaption of this model to real cases is not 
straightforward. In particular, the point spread functions of the devices (𝜏𝑃 and 𝜏𝑆 in Eq. (2)) are not 
available, and they are approximated by two Gaussian blurring filters of size 𝑘1, 𝑘2 and standard 
deviation 𝜎1, 𝜎2. 
The model is quite flexible and allows to modify different image characteristics, related to both visual 
quality and low-level signal content. Figure 3-Figure 6 show the impact of the different model 
parameters on the result. In particular, 𝜔 mainly controls the image contrast and brightness (see Figure 
3), while the overall system gamma, i.e. the combined effect of all gamma values applied to the imaged 
by the printing/scanning devices, can be adjusted by properly tuning 𝛾 (see Figure 4). Further variations 
to image color and saturation can be obtained though 𝛽𝐾 and 𝛽𝑋 parameters (see Figure 5). Finally the 
parameters of the Gaussian smoothing filter (𝑘 and 𝜎) produce the most evident modification introduced 
by the P&S process, i.e. the blurring effect represented in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 3: variation of 𝜔 parameter in the P&S simulation model applied to Figure 7.(a): this parameter mainly affects image 
contrast and brightness. 
𝜔 = 15 𝜔 = 10 𝜔 = 25  
 
Figure 4: variation of 𝛾 in the P&S simulation model applied to Figure 7.(a): this parameter regulates the gamma corrections 
produced by the printing and scanning devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: variation of 𝛽𝐾 and 𝛽𝑋 in the P&S simulation model applied to Figure 7.(a): these parameters control the image 
color and saturation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: variation of 𝑘 in the P&S simulation model applied to Figure 7.(a): this parameter controls the amount of image 
blurring. 
 
In Figure 7 a real P&S image is compared with a simulated P&S image of the same digital image. The 
image spectrum is also reported to appreciate the low-level signal modifications produced by the P&S 
process. As clearly visible in the example, the digital image is much richer of fine details (high 
𝛾 = 0.55 𝛾 = 0.50 𝛾 = 0.45 
𝛽𝐾 = 20 𝛽𝑋 = 20 𝛽𝐾 = 50 𝛽𝑋 = 20 𝛽𝐾 = 20 𝛽𝑋 = 50 
𝑘 = 5 𝑘 = 25 𝑘 = 15 
frequencies) which are noticeably attenuated after P&S. The spectrum of the simulated P&S image 
(Figure 7.(f)) is quite similar to that of the real one (Figure 7.(e)). We can quantify the similarity between 
the image spectra adopting commonly used metrics such as the spectral angle [33] (a measure of distance 
between two spectra) or the correlation value. If we compare the digital image and the real P&S of Figure 
7, the spectral angle is quite high (0.69) with a correlation value of 0.77. The similarity between the real 
P&S and the simulated one is much higher, as confirmed by the smaller spectral angle (0.38) and a 
higher correlation value (0.93). 
The parameters used for image generation (see Table 1) have been chosen in order to produce images 
visually similar to the real P&S ones (MorphDBP&S database described in Section 4.2), but no specific 
optimizations have been carried out (see Figure 7). 
 
Table 1: Parameter values used in the P&S simulation process. 
Parameter Value 
𝜔 15.5 
𝛽𝑋 20 
𝛽𝐾 20 
𝛾 0.5 
𝑘1, 𝑘2 3 
𝜎1, 𝜎2 1.2 
 
 
Figure 7: For the digital image (a) the result of the real (b) and simulated (c) P&S processes is provided. The corresponding 
image spectrum is also given for the digital image (d), the real (e) and the simulated P&S (f). 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) (f) 
4. Databases  
4.1. Training sets 
For network training we used the Progressive Morphing Database (PMDB) described in [26]. It 
contains 6000 morphed images automatically generated starting from 280 different subjects selected 
from the AR [34], FRGC [35] and Color Feret [36] [37] databases using different morphing factors (𝛼 ∈
{0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45} in Eq. (1)).  
Since PMDB contains a different number of genuine and morphed images, a new balanced database 
(called 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) has been derived as follows: 
1. two images of each subject are chosen resulting in 560 genuine images;  
2. 560 morphed images are randomly selected from the PMDB morphed images. 
The P&S process has been simulated by applying the procedure described in Section 3.2 on all 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
images; we will refer to this dataset as 𝑃&?̃?. 
 
4.2. Test sets 
The models trained on the datasets introduced in Section 4.1 are then tested on the following 
(separated) databases: 
 MorphDBD  [26]: it consists of 130 genuine images (not morphed) and 100 morphed images (50 
males and 50 females) produced with a significant manual intervention in order to minimize 
visible artifacts (see Figure 8). 
 MorphDBP&S [26]: P&S version of MorphDBD. The images have been printed on high quality 
photographic paper by a professional photographer and then scanned (see Figure 9).   
 Biometix [38]: a public dataset of 1082 morphed images obtained starting from 917 genuine 
images (of different subjects) chosen from the FERET database [36] [37] (see Figure 10).   
 
 
Figure 8: Images from MorphDBD database: digital version of genuine images of two subjects (a) and (c) and the resulting 
morphed image (b). 
 
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 9: Images from MorphDBP&S database: P&S version of the images reported in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 10: Images from Biometix database: digital version of genuine images of two subjects (a) and (c) and the resulting 
morphed image (b). 
 
4.3. Data normalization 
Since face images come from various sources presenting different size and resolution, it is important 
to normalize them before processing (see Figure 11). For this reason, each image is normalized as 
follows: 
1. the eye centers and the nose tip are detected using Neurotechnology VeriLook SDK 10.0 [39]; 
2. the image is resized to obtain an eye center distance of 150 pixels; 
3. a sub-image of size 350×400 pixels is cropped centered on the nose tip. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
 
Figure 11: Normalized images from Figure 8 (first row), Figure 9 (second row) and Figure 10 (third row). 
4.4. Data augmentation 
Both training databases (𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 and  𝑃&?̃?) contain 1120 images, not many for an effective network 
training. To increase the number of samples, data augmentation is applied obtaining different augmented 
databases (see Table 2). In particular, the following transformations are applied: 
- horizontal mirroring; 
- rotation centered on the nose tip ({-5°,0°,+5°}); 
- horizontal and vertical translation ({-1,0,+1}); 
- multi-crop, i.e. extracting from each image (size 350×400) five sub-images corresponding to 
the four corners and the central region [7]. The crop size is fixed according to the image input 
size of the specific network (see Section 5). In the tests where multi-crop is not enabled, only 
the central region is used. 
Table 2: Characteristics of the different training datasets. 
Name 
P&S 
Simulation 
Data Augmentation # Images 
Horizontal 
Mirroring 
Rotation Horizontal and 
Vertical Translation 
Multi-crop Genuine Morphed Total 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙      560 560 1120 
𝑃&?̃? √     
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢  √ √ √  30240 30240 60480 
𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  √ √ √ √  
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  √ √  √ 16800 16800 33600 
𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  √ √ √  √ 
5. Deep Neural Networks for morphing detection 
In this work we considered different well-known pre-trained deep neural networks (see Table 3). The 
first two networks, already used for morphing detection in previous works [22] [23], have been trained 
on natural images (i.e. ImageNet [40]) and therefore the learned filters are not specific for face 
representation. The last two networks are state-of-the-art models trained on very large face datasets: we 
can expect that the filters in the low and intermediate levels of these networks are capable of extracting 
very powerful face feature that can be exploited for morphing detection. 
The last layer of all the considered architectures has been changed to deal with a two class problem 
(morphed vs genuine): as a consequence, the corresponding weights need to be learned from scratch. 
 
Table 3: Neural networks used in the experimentation. 
Name Architecture 
Pre-trained on Input 
image size Image Type Database name Database size 
AlexNet [7] [41] AlexNet - BVLC version 
Natural 
ImageNet [40], specific 
ILSVRC subsets [42]  
1.2M 
227 × 227 
VGG19 [8] VGG – 19 weight layers  224 × 224 
VGG-Face16 [43] VGG – 16 weight layers [8]  
Face 
VGG-Face dataset [43] 2.6M 
224 × 224 
VGG-Face2 [44] ResNet-50 [45] VGG-Face 2 dataset [44] More than 3M 
 
5.1. Fine-tuning 
Starting from the pre-trained networks, a first fine-tuning step has been performed on 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 and 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐 datasets, separately, for 5 epochs each. Therefore, for each network architecture, we obtained 
two differently tuned networks able to detect digital morphed images but presenting poor results on P&S 
ones (see Section 6.2). To overcome this limit, a second fine-tuning step has been performed on 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  
and 𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  datasets, for a single epoch each. For both fine-tuning stages, we used SGD optimization 
with a fixed learning rate of 0.0001 and a momentum of 0.9. 
At test time, if multi-crop augmentation were used during training, the prediction probabilities are 
calculated as the average probabilities across five sub-images (i.e. the four corners and the central region) 
cropped from the normalized 350×400 image. Otherwise only the central region is used for 
classification.  
5.2. Feature extraction with external classification 
As an alternative to fine tuning, we also tested the above models as feature extractors coupled with  
external classifiers, As suggested in [22], the features from the first fully connected layer of all fine-
tuned networks (see Section 5.1) are used with two conventional classifiers such as Linear SVM [46] 
and P-CRC [47] (both using default parameters). Since their training does not scale well with respect to 
the number of patterns, the features used to train the two classifiers are extracted from the training 
datasets without augmentation (i.e. 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 and 𝑃&?̃? in Section 4.1). 
6. Experiments 
Several experiments have been carried out to evaluate the robustness of DNNs for morphing detection 
with respect to: i) cross-database testing and ii) P&S images. 
 
6.1. Testing protocol and performance indicators 
For each experiment genuine and morphed face images are used to compute Bona Fide (BPCER) and 
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rates (APCER), as defined in [48]. 
The following performance indicators are calculated: 
 Accuracy: the percentage of face images correctly classified as genuine or morphed; 
 Equal-Error Rate (EER): the error rate for which both BPCER and APCER are identical; 
 BPCER@APCER=𝑝%: the lowest BPCER for APCER≤ 𝑝%; 
 Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curve: the plot of APCER against BPCER. 
6.2. Evaluating DNNs on classification 
Table 4 reports the results obtained in terms of accuracy, EER, and BPCER (at different levels of 
APCER) as a function of i) the testing database, ii) the network and iii) the training set used. The 
corresponding DET curves are provided in Figure 12 and Figure 13. 
 
Figure 12: DET curves measured for the evaluated networks trained with digital images (𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) using different data 
augmentation strategies (Au, Mc) on MorphDBD (a) and Biometix (b) databases. 
 
Figure 13: DET curves measured for the evaluated networks with different data augmentation strategies (Au, Mc) on 
MorphDBP&S: (a) results with the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 training set, (b) results with the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑃&?̃? training set. 
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Table 4: Performance indicators of the evaluated networks on the testing databases using different training sets. The best 
result on each test database is highlighted in bold. 
Test Net Training Accuracy 
(%) 
EER 
(%) 
BPCER (%) at 
APCER=10% APCER=5% APCER=1% 
MorphDBD 
AlexNet 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 98.3 1.8 0.8 0.8 3.8 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  96.1 1.3 0.8 1.5 1.5 
VGG19 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 92.2 3.9 0.8 3.8 10.8 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  94.3 4.3 0.8 3.1 5.4 
VGG-Face16 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 93.9 3.9 0.8 1.5 10.0 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  97.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
VGG-Face2 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 95.2 1.8 0.0 1.5 3.1 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  93.0 0.9 0.0 0.8 0.8 
Biometix 
AlexNet 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 97.8 2.3 0.2 0.9 3.4 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  99.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 
VGG19 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 98.0 1.1 0.0 0.3 1.3 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  98.9 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 
VGG-Face16 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 86.2 11.5 14.3 31.1 - 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  90.7 8.4 6.3 16.0 43.4 
VGG-Face2 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 89.2 10.5 11.1 25.9 - 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  90.7 9.4 8.5 13.0 39.7 
MorphDBP&S 
AlexNet 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 43.5 28.7 50.8 53.8 66.2 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  43.5 32.7 64.6 74.6 83.1 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  67.4 20.9 43.1 52.3 70.0 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐 + 𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  83.5 13.9 25.4 41.5 77.7 
VGG19 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 47.0 32.7 57.7 71.5 89.2 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  44.3 30.4 52.3 66.9 84.6 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  60.4 18.2 36.9 45.4 70.0 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐 + 𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  56.5 24.8 49.2 54.6 55.4 
VGG-Face16 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 60.4 12.7 13.8 20.8 69.2 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  56.5 11.3 12.3 22.3 63.1 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  89.6 7.3 7.7 15.4 39.2 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐 + 𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  93.5 6.1 2.3 6.9 43.8 
VGG-Face2 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 51.7 16.5 20.0 23.8 40.0 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐  45.7 15.7 18.5 33.1 80.0 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  74.3 8.2 6.2 9.2 25.4 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑀𝑐 + 𝑃&𝑆𝑀𝑐̃  86.5 6.1 4.6 7.7 17.7 
 
The results show a variable behavior over different test databases. The performance measured over the 
two digital datasets MorphDBD and Biometix are good for all the evaluated networks, even if here the 
ImageNet pre-trained models (AlexNet and VGG-19) often achieve the best results.  We argue that to 
detect artifacts and traces of digital manipulations that characterize digital morphed images, the general 
filters learned from natural images can be even more powerful than specific filters optimized for 
invariant face recognition. This observation is aligned with the outcomes of [23]. 
The discrepancy between MorphDBD and Biometix datasets is probably due to the different morphing 
techniques used in the two databases (see Figure 14). The MorphDBD contains high quality morphed 
images, where an accurate manual intervention removed most of the visible artifacts (see Figure 8); such 
a smooth result is also obtained by the automatic procedure designed to create the training images of the 
PMDB. On the other hand, Biometix database contains morphed images of a lower visual quality, with 
artifacts (see Figure 10) which are not properly represented in the training set, and this is the probable 
cause of failure of some nets. 
 
 
Figure 14: Examples of low quality morphed images from Biometix database with clearly visible artifacts. 
 
The test on MorphDBP&S, allows to evaluate the performance when the P&S process comes into play. In 
general, the results show that networks trained only on digital images are not able to deal with P&S 
images; all the architectures suffer from this issue and provide quite bad results. Exploiting simulated 
P&S images for network training allows in some cases to obtain a significant improvement (e.g., the 
accuracy of VGG-Face16 network trained with multi-crops grows from about 56% to 93%); these results 
are quite encouraging if we consider that no real P&S images have been used during training. Overall 
an accuracy of 85-90% can be reached with reasonable values of EER and BPCER at APCER=10% and 
5%. In general, among the different data augmentation techniques, the multi-crop approach provides 
better results. Looking at the performance of the different networks, here we observe an opposite 
behavior with respect to the experiments on digital images: in fact, the best performing nets are the 
VGG-Face models pre-trained on large face datasets with AlexNet and VGG19 struggling to reach 
decent performance. Since P&S removes most of the digital artifacts we argue that more powerful and 
problem specific feature detectors are needed to solve such a complex problem.  
To better analyze the effects of extending the digital training set with simulated P&S images the genuine 
and morphed score distributions of AlexNet  and VGG-Face16 networks trained with the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 and 
the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃  training sets are reported in Figure 15. The graphs clearly show that the networks 
trained on digital images only (𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢) return a score close to 0 for both genuine and morphed 
images. This means that the modifications introduced by P&S remove the textural details that makes 
genuine and morphed images distinguishable. When training is extended with simulated P&S images 
(𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ ), the network pre-trained on face images (VGG-Face16) is able to learn P&S 
specific features making it able to discriminate genuine from morphed images. Therefore, the genuine 
scores become higher, while the morphed scores are generally kept quite low, as clearly visible by the 
score distributions for VGG-Face16. On the contrary AlexNet does not benefit of this further training 
step whose introduction determines an increment of all the scores (genuine and morphed).  
 
Figure 15: Genuine and morphed score distribution on MorphDBP&S for AlexNet and VGG-Face16 networks obtained using 
the  𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 training set (1
st column) and the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃   training set (2
nd column). 
 
6.3. Evaluating networks as feature extractors 
The results obtained using networks as feature extractors on digital and P&S images are provided in 
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. In both experiments the networks used for feature extraction are tuned 
using augmented training sets (e.g., 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢) while the external classifiers are trained on features 
extracted from datasets without any augmentation (e.g., 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙); this training strategy is referred to as 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 in the following. 
Figure 16 shows the DET curves obtained for the different networks coupled with SVM and P-CRC 
classifiers on MorphDBD and Biometix testing databases, while Figure 17 shows the DET curves on 
MorphDBP&S using the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 and the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ /𝑃&?̃? training sets. 
As to the digital databases, the results obtained are very good, with a slightly better behavior of the SVM 
classifier with respect to P-CRC. Also in this case, the different approaches perform better on MorphDBD 
than on Biometix database.  
As to the tests on MorphDBP&S using only digital images for training, the experiments confirm the 
incapacity of discriminating genuine and morphed images observed for the tested networks (see Table 
4). When a fine-tuning on simulated P&S images is performed, the performance improvement is 
confirmed for networks pre-trained on face images (VGG-Face16 and VGG-Face2). 
In conclusion, the evaluated networks seem to provide better results when directly used for image 
classification (fine-tuning), even if also when used for feature extraction provide very good results on 
the digital images. 
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Table 5: Performance indicators on the MorphDBD and Biometix testing databases using 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 as training set. 
The best result on each test database is highlighted in bold. 
Test Features Classifier Accuracy 
(%) 
EER 
(%) 
BPCER (%) at 
APCER 10% APCER 5% APCER 1% 
MorphDBD 
AlexNet – fc6 Linear SVM 97.8 2.2 0.8 0.8 10.8 
P-CRC 97.4 3.9 2.3 3.8 16.9 
VGG19 – fc6 Linear SVM 95.7 4.8 0.8 3.8 11.5 
P-CRC 94.3 4.8 0.0 3.1 26.9 
VGG-Face16 – fc6 Linear SVM 95.7 3.4 1.5 1.5 22.3 
P-CRC 94.8 3.4 1.5 3.1 16.2 
VGG-Face2 - 
pool5/7x7_s1 
Linear SVM 95.2 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.5 
P-CRC 94.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 
Biometix 
AlexNet – fc6 Linear SVM 97.9 2.3 0.2 1.0 3.8 
P-CRC 98.1 8.5 7.0 13.6 47.6 
VGG19 – fc6 Linear SVM 98.9 1.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 
P-CRC 98.4 3.0 0.0 0.9 27.9 
VGG-Face16 – fc6 Linear SVM 87.9 11.5 14.5 28.2 60.0 
P-CRC 87.0 17.6 36.1 60.4 83.0 
VGG-Face2 - 
pool5/7x7_s1 
Linear SVM 89.4 10.6 11.0 22.6 53.4 
P-CRC 89.2 11.2 13.1 21.5 46.8 
 
 
Table 6: Performance indicators on the MorphDBP&S testing database using different training sets. The best results are 
highlighted in bold. 
Features Training (Feature 
Extractor/Classifier) 
Classifier Accuracy 
(%) 
EER 
(%) 
BPCER (%) at 
APCER=10% APCER=5% APCER=1% 
AlexNet – fc6 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Linear SVM 43.5 26.5 50.8 57.7 64.6 
P-CRC 43.5 26.5 51.5 64.6 78.5 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ /𝑃&?̃? 
Linear SVM 60.9 20.0 45.5 60.0 71.5 
P-CRC 63.9 46.1 87.7 89.2 95.4 
VGG19 – fc6 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Linear SVM 44.8 29.1 53.8 69.2 85.4 
P-CRC 45.2 34.8 65.4 72.3 86.9 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ /𝑃&?̃? 
Linear SVM 62.6 19.1 40.0 42.3 52.3 
P-CRC 62.2 45.7 92.3 95.4 98.5 
VGG-Face16 – 
fc6 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Linear SVM 57.4 10.0 10.0 36.2 74.6 
P-CRC 60.0 17.0 23.1 33.8 71.5 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ /𝑃&?̃? 
Linear SVM 90.4 6.1 4.6 7.7 53.1 
P-CRC 89.1 7.8 5.4 10.0 47.7 
VGG-Face2 - 
pool5/7x7_s1 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢/𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
Linear SVM 52.6 19.6 23.1 29.2 53.1 
P-CRC 52.6 22.2 41.5 46.9 56.9 
𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑢 + 𝑃&𝑆𝐴𝑢̃ /𝑃&?̃? 
Linear SVM 80.0 9.6 8.5 14.6 33.8 
P-CRC 75.2 9.6 6.2 20.8 70.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: DET curves measured for the different networks combined with SVM and P-CRC classifiers trained using digital 
images (𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) and tested on MorphDBD (a) and Biometix (b) databases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: DET curves measured for the different networks combined with SVM and P-CRC classifiers on MorphDBP&S: (a) 
results with the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 training set, (b) results with the 𝐷𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑃&?̃? training set. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this work, different network architectures have been used for single image face morphing detection 
in both digital and P&S scenarios. In particular, we focused on P&S images, which today still represents 
a big challenge as confirmed by the results reported in Table 7 where the performance of recently 
proposed algorithms for digital and P&S images are summarized. Please note that a direct comparison 
is not possible because different datasets and protocols have been used but overall the results clearly 
show the difficulty of dealing with P&S. Our initial experiments proved that good performance can be 
achieved on digital images (BPCER=0% at APCER=10%), confirming the effectiveness of different 
networks already discussed in [17] [22] [23]. Unfortunately such low error rates cannot be extended to 
P&S images (BPCER about 12% at APCER=10%) if only digital images are used for training. To 
overcome this problem, an automatic generation procedure has been proposed to simulate the typical 
P&S image degradation. When combined with automatic morphing generation it allows to produce a 
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vast amount of training data for network training/tuning without the costs/efforts needed to manually 
print and scan face images. 
The use of simulated P&S images allowed to significantly improve morphing detection performance, 
achieving a BPCER=2.3% at APCER=10% which is, to the best of our knowledge, a state-of-the-art 
result for P&S images (see Table 7). The obtained results are quite promising also considering that the 
demorphing approach proposed in [26], exploiting a second image as helper, when tested on the same 
dataset (MorphDBP&S) shows comparable performance (BPCER about 0.8% at APCER 10%).   
 
Table 7: Summary of results for recently proposed morphing detection approaches (single image) on various digital and P&S 
datasets. Note that a direct comparison is not feasible since different databases and protocols have been used. 
Image 
type 
Approach Accuracy 
(%) 
EER 
(%) 
BPCER (%) at 
APCER 10% APCER 5% APCER 1% 
Digital 
[13] 98.4 - - - - 
[22] - 8.2 7.5 14.4 - 
[23] - - - - ~3.5 
[24] - 3.1 - - - 
[29] - 3.3 - - - 
[20] - 32.7 61.7 - - 
[25] - 2.8 0.7 1.8 - 
[5] - 7.1 5.6 11.7 - 
[16] - 2.5 - - - 
[17] 93.6 - - - - 
[18] - - - - ~1.0 
[19] - 2.2 0.1 0.6 - 
Proposed approach 99.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.9 
P&S 
[22] - 12.5 16.4 28.8 - 
[5] - 20.7 22.4 44.2 - 
[21] 82.4 - - - - 
Proposed approach 93.5 6.1 2.3 6.9 43.8 
 
Since the size of our training databases does not allow to train large models from scratch, all the CNN 
used in this work were pre-trained. The experiments highlighted that CNN pre-trained on natural images 
(ImageNet) can perform well on digital images, while CNN specifically pre-trained on face images 
(VGG Face datasets) perform better on P&S images. We argue that to detect textural differences between 
genuine and morphed (digital) images, the filters learned from natural images are quite good, while in 
presence of P&S images more sophisticated and face-specific filters are necessary to detect the fine 
artifacts that survive the printing and scanning process. Some preliminary works [24], aimed at 
understanding the factors influencing the network decision, analyzed the importance of different face 
regions for morphing detection on digital images. Further studies are necessary to better understand and 
explain these phenomena especially on P&S images: we believe that existing visualization techniques 
(see [49]) can be profitably used to this purpose.  
Recently Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [50] have been successfully used for various image 
generation applications (e.g., [51]); their adoption for P&S simulation will be studied in our future 
researches. 
Finally, since performance are datasets dependent, and the specific morphing technique used has a 
noticeable impact on the morphing detection accuracy, we believe that the availability of common 
datasets and/or benchmarks is fundamental for the research community. To this purpose, a valuable 
contribution comes from NIST with the Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) MORPH competition 
[52], to which we plan to submit our algorithm in the near future.  
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